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ABSTRACT Popularly referred to as the “crazy” project, Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s Istanbul Canal Project has been debated vigorously since its proposal prior 
to the 2011 elections in the country. While some questioned its economic and ecological 
feasibility, others carried the discussion towards the Project’s political implications. In 
addition to evaluating these debates, in this Policy Brief we discuss the Project through a 
historical perspective that includes the dynamics of the 1936 Montreux Convention. We 
argue that the feasibility of the Canal Project is valid only after certain changes are made in 
the application of the Montreux Convention.  However, we conclude that this may lead to an 
outcome in which the signatories would question the legitimacy of the Convention under 
present conditions.  
 
Introduction 
Proposed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan in an election campaign speech 
on April 29, 2011 and often referred to as 
the “crazy” project, the Istanbul Canal 
Project that will connect Black Sea and the 
Sea of Marmara bypassing the Strait of 
Istanbul has elicited many questions and 
criticisms. While some mentioned the 
ecological damage that the Project may 
cause, others referred to the consequen-
ces of a possible rentier economy that it 
might lead to.  There were also others 
who argued that the potential resources 
that would be spent on the Project could 
be used more efficiently. 
Despite being an election pledge, the 
Prime Minister’s statement was taken 
seriously by almost everyone (except his 
political opponents). Indeed, land 
speculation started in the area that the 
Canal is estimated to pass through, and 
Ankara representative of the country that 
is sensitive about the status of the Straits 
made a statement. 
We do not yet know how much work has 
been done on this proposed Canal Project, 
or how feasible it is. Yet, we also take the 
Prime Minister’s statement seriously and 
fundamentally believe that the construct-
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ion of a waterway that would bypass the 
Istanbul Strait would be a fair decision 
that could also minimize the risk of 
accidents. (We naturally attach importan-
ce to the security of the city of Istanbul.) 
According to the data of the Under-
secretary of Navigation, 50,871 vessels 
passed through the Istanbul Strait in 2010. 
We can add that this number – and hence 
the risk of accidents – will increase as the 
trade capacities of the countries of the 
Black Sea basin expand. Additionally, 
considering the petroleum and the other 
dangerous items that are transported 
from the shores of the Black Sea – first 
and foremost from the Port of Novorosisk 
– to the world markets through the 
Istanbul Strait, we believe 
that the importance of 
opening up a new bypass 
route is self-evident. 
Despite rules that regulate 
the transits through the 
Turkish straits, the sche-
mas of traffic distinction 
and the radar systems 
(VTS), it is not possible to 
say that the risk of 
accidents has been elimi-
nated. Small accidents due 
to rudder lock-up, engine 
breakdown or human error that do not 
cause tangible damage, and therefore do 
not get much attention, still take place 
despite preventive measures. The 
morphological characteristics of the 
Istanbul Strait also contribute to the 
occurrence of such accidents.   
In any case, it is essential to consider the 
political and legal outcomes of imple-
menting such a Project. The first that 
comes to mind is the fact that the 
prospective Canal would challenge the 
Montreux Convention, which regulates 
the transit through the Straits region.  
The Montreux Convention 
The Montreux Convention, which was 
signed at the beautiful Montreux Palace 
Hotel located on the shores of Lake 
Geneva in July 1936, replacing the 
Lausanne Straits Convention of July 24, 
1923, governs the transit of battleships 
and commercial ships through the so-
called “Straits” (including the Sea of 
Marmara) during times of peace, war or a 
threat of war.  
The convention guarantees the security of 
Turkey to a large extent through 
restrictions on, and notification obliga-
tions for battleships, especially during 
peacetime; assures the strategic balance 
of the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean; and pro-
vides a political role for 
Turkey in the case of a 
possible threat of war.  
The constitutive balanced 
nature of the convention 
also serves the interests 
of the Russian Federation, 
preventing the presence 
of any non-coastal mili-
tary power in the Black 
Sea that has a tonnage 
above 45,000. Thus, in the 
case of the “collapse” of the Convention, 
the interests of the Russian Federation will 
be damaged as much as Turkey’s.  
The danger of the collapse of the 
Montreux Straits regime derives from the 
possibility that the method of calculating 
the fees for non-stop transits in 
application since 1983 could be changed, 
leading to objections.  
Three types of taxation and duties are 
collected for the transit through the Straits 
area: health inspection, lighthouse and 
rescue services. As an example, a 
commercial ship with a net tonnage of 
As an example, a commercial 
ship with a net tonnage of 
10,000 that enters the Straits 
from the Black Sea is obliged 
to pay 4,881 USD to Turkey for 
a transit pass. It does not 
seem likely that this amount 
would be sufficient for the 
construction and operation of 
the proposed Canal when we 
also consider the transit fees 
for the other similar canals. 
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10,000 that enters the Straits from the 
Black Sea is obliged to pay 4,881 USD to 
Turkey for a transit pass. It does not seem 
likely that this amount would be sufficient 
for the construction and operation of the 
proposed Canal when we also consider the 
transit fees for the other similar canals.  
Although this issue will only be clarified 
after a detailed economic feasibility study, 
the data we have suggest that the 
resources provided by the current system 
are not adequate for the construction of 
the Canal. 
In fact, the fee for the transit of vessels 
through the Turkish Straits covers the 
entire passage. In other words, the cost of 
transit through the Strait 
of Istanbul is only a 
portion of the total sum 
paid. The transit pass is 
two-sided and even 
covers the Strait of 
Çanakkale and the Sea of 
Marmara in addition to 
Strait of Istanbul. 
Moreover, we should also 
emphasize that deterrents 
and artificial delays at the 
entrances of the Straits 
are not possible to 
enforce; the system that 
was tried for the Baku-
Ceyhan line in 1994 failed. 
The International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and professional associations follow 
the transits through the Straits closely, 
arranging the necessary technical 
regulations with traffic distinction 
schemas and VTS systems. 
Unless there are certain changes in the 
Montreux Convention’s provisions regar-
ding the transit of commercial ships, it is 
almost impossible that the Canal passa-
geway could complete with Strait of 
Istanbul transit route with the introduc-
tion of deterrent measures. Despite the 
political, legal and economic conse-
quences, it is naturally possible, if 
considered essential, that Turkey can close 
transits through the Straits, referring to 
the Canal as an alternative for the Strait of 
Istanbul.  
Yet, even in such a condition, the financial 
resources to be generated will not 
increase. If the financing of the Canal is 
based on the transit fees, the only 
possibility that can be brought to the 
agenda might be the word-by-word 
implementation of the Montreux Straits 
Convention. In the case of such a scenario, 
the transit fees would increase many 
times more: according to 
the gold rate as of August 
4, 2011, the fee would 
increase to 59,976 USD 
for the previously exem-
plified commercial ship 
that has a tonnage of 
10,000.  
Within the scope of this 
short study, we will 
emphasize that with the 
re-introduction of Gold 
Francs as the basis for the 
transit fee payments – 
mentioned in Appendix-1 
of the Montreux Straits 
Convention yet not imple-
mented after 1983 – the 
transit through the Strait would become 
expensive, which in fact may render the 
financing of the Canal Project possible 
along with a competitive pricing strategy.  
However, this is not a feasibility study. Its 
main purpose is to point out the obstacles 
facing the Istanbul Canal Project and draw 
attention to the fact that a regime 
founded by the Montreux Convention and 
meeting virtually all of Turkey’s security 
needs may collapse.  
Within the scope of this short 
study, we will emphasize that 
with the re-introduction of 
Gold Francs as the basis for 
the transit fee payments – 
mentioned in Appendix-1 of 
the Montreux Straits 
Convention yet not 
implemented after 1983 – the 
transit through the Strait 
would become expensive, 
which in fact may render the 
financing of the Canal Project 
possible along with a 
competitive pricing strategy. 
 
 
THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF THE ISTANBUL CANAL PROJECT 
MENSUR AKGÜN & SYLVİA TİRYAKİ 
 
 
 
4
  
  
 G
L
O
B
A
L
 P
O
L
I
T
I
C
A
L
 T
R
E
N
D
S
 C
E
N
T
E
R
 (
G
P
o
T
)
 
Historical Background 
When the Ottoman Empire took over 
Akkarman Castle, located near Odessa, in 
1484, it had acquired the control of all the 
Black Sea shores, closing the transit 
through the Straits of Istanbul and 
Çanakkale to all ships with foreign flags. 
While France in 1535 and England in 1602 
obtained the right to trade in seas under 
the dominion of the Empire, this right 
exempted transit to Black Sea.  
The Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Ali) in all 
agreements since 1484, registered the 
principal of “closed-ness” as a right of the 
“ancestries’ heritage” (ecdattan mevrus). 
The transit right, recognized for Austria in 
1718 with the Treaty of Passarowitz, was 
not put into action until 1783. The 
principal that the Straits 
would be closed to all 
ships with foreign flags 
only changed after the 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, 
signed with Russia in 1774, 
as its Article 11 provided 
free transit for commercial 
ships. 
The privilege given to 
France in 1802 was later 
extended to England, and 
the flag restriction for the 
transit of the commercial 
ships was weakened in parallel to the 
weakening of the Empire and the 
increasing control of the shores of the 
Black Sea by Czarist Russia. On the other 
hand, the transit of warships with foreign 
flags was first permitted in 1798 during 
Napoleon’s Egypt campaign.  
The regime that managed the Straits of 
Çanakkale and Istanbul acquired a 
multilateral character with the signing of 
the Treaty of Kale-i Sultan on January 5, 
1809, in which the Sublime Porte officially 
assured England of the principle that the 
Straits would be closed to the foreign 
warships. Therefore, the Straits regime 
stopped being an issue of domestic law 
and became an inter-state issue. This 
understanding was confirmed with 
multilateral agreements that were signed 
in London in 1841, in Paris in 1856, again 
in London in 1871, and in Berlin in 1878. 
Defeated in World War I, Turkey signed 
the Armistice of Moudros on October 30, 
1918, opening up its Straits to warships in 
line with Article 1 of the Agreement. With 
the Article 37 of the Treaty of Sevres, 
signed on August 10, 1920, Turkey also 
confirmed the absolute liberality principle. 
The Straits Convention, which is in the 
appendix of the Lausanne Treaty of July 
24, 1923, also accepted transit liberty as a 
universal rule, protecting Turkey’s, and 
especially Soviet Russia’s, 
interests with the 
limitations it put on the 
transit of warships.  
However, the Lausanne 
Straits Convention bro-
ught about the disarma-
ment of the Straits region 
and the management of 
the regime through an 
international commission, 
not through Turkey itself. 
The regime that was 
established in Lausanne 
was changed with the Montreux Straits 
Convention that was signed on July 20, 
1936. With the establishment of the new 
regime, Turkey won back many of its 
supremacy rights – particularly regarding 
demilitarization – guaranteeing its security 
to a large extent.  
The Montreux Convention, composed of 
29 articles, four appendixes and one 
protocol, indicates that the signatories 
accept the principle of transit liberty as a 
universal rule in its Article 1 and, in the 
following sections, explains the passage of 
The regime that was 
established in Lausanne was 
changed with the Montreux 
Straits Convention that was 
signed on July 20, 1936. With 
the establishment of the new 
regime, Turkey won back 
many of its supremacy rights - 
particularly regarding 
demilitarization - 
guaranteeing its security to a 
large extent. 
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warships and commercial ships through 
the Straits during times of peace, war and 
threat of war. Additionally, with the 
restrictions the Convention imposes on 
warships regarding the total amount of 
goods they can carry at one time, Turkey 
has turned into a key player of the 
Mediterranean-Black Sea balance. 
Article 2 of the Montreux Convention 
dealing with the transit of commercial 
ships is particularly important with regards 
to the Istanbul Canal Project. It states that 
in times of peace commercial ships, 
regardless of their flags or loads, can 
completely benefit from transportation 
freedom during the day or night, as long 
as they comply with the health rules 
indicated in Article 3. Moreover, the 
Convention expresses that ships are not 
exempt from any taxation or duties other 
than the ones specified in Article 1 of the 
Convention. 
In summary, as long as this article exists it 
is impossible for Turkey to close the Straits 
with deterrent measures and to direct 
ships carrying hazardous 
material such as petro-
leum or gas to the Canal, 
asking for a higher fee. By 
justifying the risks that 
these kinds of ships pose, 
Turkey could direct them 
to use the planned Canal 
only by charging an equal 
amount for the use of 
both of the waterways. 
For this, the fee that Turkey charges for 
the transit through the Strait of Istanbul 
needs to be increased to the amount that 
is acknowledged under the original version 
of the Montreux Convention, which means 
returning to the Gold Franc basis.  
The Gold Franc 
Article 1 of the Montreux Convention 
states that in the case that the timeframe 
between the departure and arrival of the 
commercial ships that pass through the 
Straits does not exceed six months, the 
following fees – for one time and per ton – 
will be charged: 0.075 Gold Francs for 
health inspection; 0.42 Gold Francs for 
torch and float services for tonnages until 
800; 0.21 Gold Francs for the tonnages 
above 800; and 0.1 Gold Francs for all the 
other services, mainly including rescue 
services.  
Turkey implemented a transit fee through 
a rate that was close to the real value of 
this currency unit – which is not in 
circulation anymore – until 1983, when 
the Central Bank fixed the rate of 1 Gold 
Franc to 0.8063 USD, which has remained 
fixed to the present day. This, as we 
mentioned previously, induces Turkey to 
charge a nominal fee for the transit pass. 
While the Turkish Government mentioned 
that Turkey would return 
to the Gold Franc basis 
starting from January, 
there have not been any 
attempts to do so so far. 
Considering the Montre-
ux Convention’s articles 
and appendixes, it is valid 
to charge transit fees 
through the Gold Franc. 
However, more than 
being a legally binding text, the Montreux 
Convention today is used as an agreement 
that determines the fundamental norms 
of the Straits regime, which is 
implemented by Turkey with the approval 
of other actors that benefit from its 
current implementation. Turkey’s attempt 
to return to an interpretation that reflects 
the text rather than the spirit of the 
In summary, as long as this 
article exists [Article 2 of the 
Montreux Convention] it is 
impossible for Turkey to close 
the Straits with deterrent 
measures and to direct ships 
carrying hazardous material 
such as petroleum or gas to the 
Canal, asking for a higher fee. 
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agreement may bring about the collapse 
of the regime itself. 
Indeed, many concepts and descriptions 
that appear in the text of the agreement 
do not reflect the realities of our present 
day and, in many cases, do not coincide 
with the norms of international law. A 
word-by-word interpretation of Appendix 
1 may lead to more than one signatory’s 
demand for modifications. 
Yet Article 29 of the Conventionallows for 
such change. According to the article, 
starting with the entry of the agreement 
into force, three months before the end of 
every five-year period each of the 
signatory states can recommend changes 
in one or a few articles of the Convention.  
Conclusion 
The moment that Pandora’s box is 
opened, there are not many chances for 
the agreement to survive. As emphasized 
above, many articles of the agreement 
have already completed their life spans in 
terms of their legal and technical 
perspectives. Ranging from the references 
to the League of Nations to the types of 
weapons that are prohibited to be 
transited, there are articles in the 
agreement that do not make sense under 
the conditions of our present day.  
Moreover, paragraph 2 of Article 28 states 
that the principle of transit and navigation 
liberty, which is mentioned in Article 1, is 
eternal. According to Dr. Sevin Toluner, in 
her seminal legal analyses on the issue of 
the Straits, “in the case of the 
disappearance of the Montreux order, the 
contracting parties have expressed their 
intention to uphold the principle of transit 
liberty as foreseen by international 
customs and traditions.” 
When one considers that Article 1 of the 
agreement makes no distinction between 
warships and commercial ships, it can be 
said that, in the case of the collapse of the 
Montreux Convention, the principle of 
transit liberty would also apply to 
warships during times of peace. Indeed, 
according to its April 9, 1949 decision 
regarding two Great British destroyers 
that crashed on October 22, 1946 while 
passing the Corfu Canal as a result of 
mines laid by Albania, the International 
Court of Justice ruled that the warships 
could use their right to innocent passage 
while transiting through international 
waterways.  
To summarize, the financing of the 
Istanbul Canal under the current circum-
stances seems possible only with the re-
introduction of the Gold Franc standard. 
Nevertheless, this transition will probably 
be painful and require massive diplomatic 
energy on the part of Turkey. 
The construction of the Canal requires 
serious legal analysis, diplomatic effort 
and political vision. This short study argues 
that the collapse of the Montreux Con-
vention, which protects Turkey’s interests, 
is one possible outcome of the Istanbul 
Canal Project that should be taken 
seriously. 
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